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A CENTURY IN RESERVE AND BEYOND
On 23 April 1908 Congress passed legislation creating a reserve corps of medical officers.
1 Over the past century that initial cadre of physicians has evolved into a mission critical operational force employing over 190,000 Soldiers in support of domestic and expeditionary operations. Today the Army Reserve is part of the operational force, best described in the current vision for the Army Reserve:
The Army Reserve is a community-based federal operational force of skillrich warrior-citizens providing complementary capabilities for joint expeditionary and domestic operations.
2
Its role as an operational force places new demands on the Army Reserve, its Soldiers, Families, employers, and the defense budget. How did this evolution take place? The recent final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve asserts the reserve component assumed its operational posture without the benefit of a national debate, a decision they find is not sustainable over time. 3 More importantly, by transforming the Army Reserve into an operational force, the Army is left without a strategic reserve, a supplementary force to address a national emergency that is beyond the scope of the existing force structure. 4 This Strategy Research Project (SRP) explores this evolution. By tracing the concept of the reserve from the early days of the Republic, from the Constitutional debates of the 18 th and 19 th centuries, and from the legislation leading to the establishment of the Army Reserve, it describes the role of the Army Reserve from its beginning as a reserve corps of medical doctors to that of a strategic reserve force, and then to its current operational role. It briefly discusses some of the implications of this evolution on current readiness. Finally, this SRP envisions a future of the Army Reserve to include its role as a strategic reserve in addition to the operational role it is currently fulfilling.
This SRP does not take a position on whether the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard should coexist, or should be combined into a single organization. That debate has continued since the beginnings of the republic; it has been settled by Congress in favor of the current structure. So this SRP addresses this issue only to clarify how the Army Reserve developed.
The concept of a federally controlled reserve force for the United States of America was introduced in a 1783 document by George Washington which stressed the need for a small standing army and a well organized and federally regulated national militia. Washington clearly advised that the militia must be uniformly organized, welldisciplined, and responsive to the country as a whole. 5 His proposal was rejected. We should recall that our founding fathers favored a weak central government with power Congress established the nation's reliance on the independent state-controlled militias with no federal oversight as the nation's permanent military policy. 7 In June 1812, when the United States went to war with the British, the United
States depended upon the militia for its defense. The response to a call-up of the militia was mixed, as some states failed to comply and others restricted their forces to defense of the homeland. 8 While there were instances of exceptional performance, the overall performance of the militia reflected poorly on the institutional policies and politics of the system. 9 In the aftermath of the war Secretary of War John C. Calhoun suggested the "Expansible Army Plan", which proposed for a professional force of 6,000 in peacetime that would serve as a cadre for rapid expansion to double or triple that strength in war.
The standing force would be composed of half-strength units with full complements of officers. In times of crisis, these units would be filled by individual volunteers and draftees. This plan was also rejected because it placed too much power in the hands of the federal government. Since reform of the militia system seemed to be futile, the nation had little choice but to rely on it and whatever standing army the Congress was willing to fund. Reserve divisions were ordered to active duty, they were led by only a few of the Reserve officers originally assigned to them. In reality, they were no longer Reserve divisions. and combat service support (CSS) roles 27 . In separate legislation, the position of Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) was created to advise the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve matters. 28 This structure would remain until the early 1990s, when the U.S. Army
Reserve Command (USARC) was established and 10 Regional Support Commands (RSCs) replaced the ARCOMs. 29 Subsequently, the RSCs would reorganize as This transition from a strategic reserve to an operational force was unplanned. The Reserve forces. Then Reserve forces will deploy only one year out of every five. 40 To achieve this reasonable ratio, structural changes, increased personnel, new kinds of training, new equipment, and appropriate policies will be needed.
As the Reserve mission has evolved, the need for structural change has become more evident. The Army Reserve forces of 11 September 2001 were generally configured and aligned under the strategic reserve paradigm of the Cold War. The Army
Reserve has since undertaken its most comprehensive restructuring since the period immediately following World War II to optimize the contributions it can make to the overall effort. Non-deploying force structure, primarily command and control overstructure, and low demand forces are being converted into more relevant forces in demand. As a result of this transformation these forces-and the skills they representare becoming more accessible and more readily deployable, thereby enhancing our ability to meet current and future needs. 41 Similarly, the luxury of taking months to train following mobilization no longer exists. At the onset of recent operations, some Army Reserve units have been required to deploy with the first elements. 42 In addition, the twelve-month mobilization limit imposed by the January 2007 Department of Defense mobilization policy allows minimal time for post-mobilization training. This policy establishes a goal of no more than 30 to 60 days of post mobilization training. 43 To ensure units are ready when called upon, the Army Reserve is changing its approach to training from one of Alert-Mobilize-TrainDeploy to one of Train-Alert-Deploy. 44 With increased training tempo in the year prior to mobilization units will incorporate collective events, warfighting skills, and theaterspecific training requirements-training formerly provided at the mobilization stationinto pre-mobilization training. 45 This requires thorough individual readiness to be developed in the first years of the training cycle, with the goal of providing a full array of capable ready units available when needed. 46 
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To meet more stringent deployment criteria, provide a predictable cycle of four years for training and one year deployed. 51 A particular area of concern is the on-going shortage of mid-level officers.
Redressing this shortfall is critical to sustaining relevant and ready units, because these officers fill essential leadership and staff positions. This shortage is greatest among captains, with only fifty-nine percent on-hand, but it is also critical among majors, with only seventy-two percent available. 52 To reverse this trend, increased emphasis on recruiting officers is required, including more attractive incentive programs to encourage officers leaving active duty to join Army Reserve units. Reversing this trend will take time, especially in view of current and projected shortages in the Army Active
Component.
53
Equipment shortages also plague the Army Reserve. As an operational force, the Army Reserve can no longer afford to be equipped below authorized levels, or with outdated equipment. To contribute effectively to current operations, Reserve Soldiers must be able to train with the same equipment they will use during operations. But the Army Reserve is short approximately $10.8 billion in equipment. This shortage is exacerbated by the impact of increased operating tempo and requirements for returning units to leave equipment in theater. As with personnel, we cannot expect a quick fix, despite increased funding levels for this purpose. 54 To compensate for these shortages, the Army Reserve has developed a bridging strategy to concentrate equipment at selected sites to optimize availability for training opportunities as units progress through the training cycle. 55 Units will maintain minimal equipment at home station to support required training, but collective training events will be supported by concentrations of equipment at major training sites. An additional benefit of this strategy is the reduced 13 transportation costs gained by not shipping as much equipment; freeing funding that can be reprogrammed to meet other priorities. 56 To successfully implement ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve must continue to receive programmed equipment and funding to procure additional equipment to fill shortages. Additional equipment is needed as units are converted and as structure grows. But eventually all units should be equipped to 100 percent of authorized levels.
Finally, funding increases are required to sustain equipment readiness as operating tempo steadily increases. 57 to avoid an increase in the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature. 62 With this in mind, it is clear that using these forces in ongoing operations, in addition to the necessity cited above, is appropriate to their purpose under the Constitution. Once the Army Reserve has completed the transition to serving as an operational force, we need then to focus on what we have given up to become an integral part of the operational Army-the strategic reserve.
In her testimony to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Christine Wormuth, a well-known defense analyst, pointed out that reliance on the National Guard and Reserves in their operational role is likely to remain high, with emphasis on things like DSCA and homeland defense, in addition to continued support for contingency operations. She cautiously mentioned of, "unforeseen events that might happen overseas that might require U.S. action." 63 It is these "unforeseen events" that dramatize the need for a strategic reserve. In fact, one study asserts that, "The raison d'être of a strategic reserve is to have some extra combat power available if our planning assumptions turn out to be wrong and something unanticipated happens." In view of Army Reserve history, the evolution of the Army Reserve to its role in the Army's current operational force, and the need for a strategic reserve to hedge against future uncertainty, consider the following proposed course of action to satisfy the nation's current and future needs. 
